W.J. Basil Fernando

To begin any discussion on democratization it is necessary to have some common understanding of what this word means. Over many years I have developed a working definition of democratization that can be expressed as follows: democratization is a process whereby people engage in constructing a state for their own benefit with social equality as its core principle, working though an elected government operating under the rule of law, supported by functioning institutions subject to a constitutional framework incorporating international norms and standards as set out in United Nations’ human rights treaties and covenants.

This definition is a bit lengthy, but not without good reason. It is based on literally thousands of discussions I have participated in throughout Asia and the Pacific. It incorporates the most critical characteristics of democratization revealed to me through those discussions. These elements I will now outline in more detail, before turning to some observations flowing from the definition, and concluding with illustrations of democratic transitions and conflicts in Asia and the Pacific.

The elements of democratization

First, democratization is a process that people enter into to create a state for their own benefit. Many governments in the region have been disowned by a large section of their societies because the costs they impose on the people outweigh the benefits.

An important requirement for this element of democratization is genuine sovereignty. Sovereignty implies the capacity to use natural resources and other sources of wealth primarily for the nation’s own benefit. Thus, it is contradictory to suggest that a colonial power can ‘create democracy.’ Colonizers rule over countries for their own benefit, and the kind of ‘democracy’ they introduce has the same characteristics.

Unfortunately, throughout Asia today there is an overwhelming feeling that development of economic policies for the people’s benefit is virtually impossible. The global economy subordinates national interests to its own wider interests. This situation has had a devastating effect on democratization in Asia. Instead of a sense of sovereignty there exists widespread feelings of powerlessness.

Many conflicts arise as a result. One is between the local elites who perceive their own interests to be tied to external powers, and the people who suffer because of this attitude. Sometimes these conflicts give rise to struggles for self-determination. Many of the claims to self-determination made by the separatist movement in Aceh, for instance, stem from complaints that the local people have not seen the benefits of resources extracted from their bountiful territory. Many indigenous peoples in the region, for example the Melanesian people, also find their way of life threatened by global and regional developments that have scant regard for their centuries of cultural and social development.

Secondly, my definition of democratization deepens its meaning beyond the shift towards mere formal democracy. The presence of formal democracy is often mistaken for genuine change. By formal democracy I mean the holding of elections whereby regimes are endorsed through the ballot box. This kind of ‘democracy’ legitimizes the ruling elite, but does hold that elite accountable through an effective system of law enforcement. It in fact offers people few opportunities to participate in political life, other than the periodic ratification of the status quo. It also denies people opportunities to intervene in order to stem abuses of power and rampant corruption. At worst, entire elections may become farcical. Under such circumstances, the ‘rule of law’ is nothing more than the rules of the rulers designed to safeguard and perpetuate their power at the expense of popular freedoms. In many countries in the region formal democracy was introduced by the colonial powers. Decades after the demise of colonial regimes, peoples throughout Asia are struggling to expand and develop rudimentary democratic structures. In fact, elite groups who have happily manipulated and benefited from what was left by colonial powers strongly resist attempts towards more substantive democracy. Such resistance again results in many conflicts.

Thirdly, people who are democratizing are simultaneously constructing their state. A common misconception is that states are conceived via constitutions, born at independence or some other important occasion, and are then ready to serve their peoples’ interests. Yet often constitutions establish ideal visions of state and social institutions which do not even exist at the time of independence. Although usually interrelated, the making of a constitution and the making of a state are two entirely different activities. This is very important to understand when considering countries in Asia, where the terminology of democracy adopted from the west often amounts to little more than confused and meaningless jumble. Even apparently simple words like ‘parliament,’ ‘court,’ ‘judge,, ‘accountability’ and ‘human rights’ are used and understood in dramatically different ways. A parliament may be the place where the views of one person or a small minority are rubber-stamped. A court may be the place where sanctions are imposed on ordinary citizens while the executive operates with impunity. A judge may be a person without legal qualifications, or a mere party stooge. Accountability may be a mere word without any effective mechanisms to ensure that it is practiced. Human rights may be concepts ratified and agreed to on paper, without any genuine efforts to see them implemented. Hence, there may be a huge gap between the principles of statehood outlined in a constitution, and the realities of statehood that the citizens know from their day to day lives. It follows that democratization necessitates tireless efforts to build a state that is capable of enforcing its principles.

Fourthly, social equality is at the heart of genuine democratization. This may seem obvious to people brought up in the west, where social and political revolutions displaced earlier feudal models of statehood premised on social inequality. In Asia, however, feudal models and mentalities remain deeply entrenched. While again the constitutions of newly independent states readily expressed the principle of equality, an enormous gap persists between constitutional rhetoric and social reality. In India this was recognized even from the first instance, when the chairman of the Constitutional Committee, Dr B R Ambedkar, stated in parliament that with the inauguration of the new constitution “we will have equality in politics and inequality in social and economic life”.[i] He continued, “We must remove this contradiction at the earliest moment or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this Assembly has so laboriously built up.”[ii] The inability of Asian states to realize constitutional acceptance of equality remains the source of many conflicts.

Equality is affected by both internal and external factors. Inequality in international relationships has in itself become a major source of conflict in the region. When a nation is impoverished due to global arrangements, it cannot function democratically. Elected governments overburdened with external debts and unreasonable demands from international agencies find themselves simply incapable of resolving internal social and economic problems, and soon lose popularity. That subject of so much propaganda, terrorism, is also rooted not so much in ethnicity or region as it is in social inequality.[iii]

Fifthly, democratization involves everybody. It is an engagement that brings together all social groups. It is the flow of ideas between all sections of society that gives sustenance to substantive democracy. Historically, as colonial rulers handed power over to their indigenous counterparts, democracy was understood as a transfer of power between elites. Often the state and its basic institutions were the products of colonial administrations. In such circumstances people had very little opportunity to help shape the institutions that would govern them. As a result, in the words of one scholar, “The institutions were not strong enough to mould and retain the concepts and retreated in the face of other ideas and concepts stronger than themselves”.[iv] Rather than pursue the concept of democracy, elite groups found it easier to behave autocratically. This style of governance inevitably leads to conflict. Thus democratization mandates the constant soliciting of, and respect for, the views of all people in the society at the political level.

The conflicts that have arisen between elite groups and others in society since independence have also had much to do with the unjust accumulation of wealth by those in positions of power. This again speaks to the role of social equality in democratization. When democratizing, historically based inequalities must be addressed. Often this is done by popular initiatives. When state institutions fail to protect people from exploitation, they develop ways to protect themselves. These may include collective programmes to safeguard economic resources, including land, crops and cattle. Groups may organize to monitor and lobby against attempts by an elite group to expropriate basic resources such as drinking water, staple foods and public transport. Community actions may also be developed to defend people’s rights, such as through solidarity work to protect women from being trafficked and treated as mere goods in business transactions. Even under the worst circumstances, an authoritarian state cannot fully subdue its people. Resistance always bubbles up somewhere, however subtly. Whatever the action, if democracy is to be rooted in society, such initiatives must have a central position in rebuilding efforts, lest it be regarded as simply imposed from above.

Sixthly, democratization requires adherence to the notion of the rule of law, backed by institutions designed and prepared to enforce it. Many elected governments have done away with one or more aspects of the rule of law. This may be via martial law or draconian emergency regulations that exceed the limits imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It may be via national security laws, introduced on various pretexts intended to suspend basic rights and stifle political opposition. It may be via the absence of any effectively functioning judiciary; judicial powers may be restricted or suspended, or cases my undergo delays of a decade or more. It may be because governments have tacitly permitted or actively established police forces that themselves constitute a major threat to the rule of law. In other cases, prosecution systems are so defective as to all but guarantee impunity to perpetrators of human rights violations. The bureaucracy also can be so beset with corruption and inefficiency that no one seriously expects it to respect principles of fairness and objectivity. Under such circumstances, a government may pretend to ensure the rule of law by establishing or pointing to institutions ostensibly established to uphold it. But where the most corrupt persons in a society set up a commission against corruption it cannot be expected to have any good results. Where those who operate with the greatest impunity staff a judiciary with incompetents and cronies, it will defeat the purpose of the rule of law. Thus the presence of effectively functioning institutions to ensure the rule of law is a critical element in democratization. The mere existence of a certain institution does not mean that it is functioning to uphold the rule of law.

Often there is resistance to the rule of law. Many times, some form of authoritarianism is advocated as a necessity for the early stages of development. Where state ideology is based on legitimization of one or another form of authoritarianism, democracy is portrayed as an obstacle to development and a source of internal conflict. In fact, this portrayal of democracy as anarchy is quite common in Asia.

Seventhly, democratization requires that state institutions be held responsible through a constitutional framework that incorporates international norms and standards as set out by United Nations’ human rights treaties and covenants. This is a most important condition, as invariably laws are used not to enhance freedoms but rather to restrict them. Forced expropriation of crops, eviction of people from their lands, massive deforestation, arbitrary detention, widespread disappearances and many other human rights violations have been undertaken with legal sanction. The requirement that a state must conform to some basic norms and standards arises from the need for working criteria to eradicate unjust laws and undemocratic practices. These standards, expressed in the body of international law developed over many years, are intended to nullify arbitrary practices that may have the appearance of law, and a state that is serious about democratizing is obliged to incorporate them into its domestic structure.[v]

Some observations flowing from the definition

There is little benefit in simply classifying countries in Asia as ‘democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’. Countries with a surface appearance of democracy may have many authoritarian characteristics. Singapore and Malaysia are two examples of this. Singapore has a draconian system of social control. The separation of powers exists only in name: there is virtually no power of judicial review over state actions. Elections are far from free and fair; opposition parties are given no chance to gain power. For its part, Malaysia has developed many authoritarian characteristics since the late seventies. The independence of the judiciary has been undermined, and there is virtually no genuine freedom of the press. In both countries internal security laws are used mainly against political opponents of the ruling parties. However, there has been very little support for political dissidents in these two countries, as for a long time both have been seen as allies of the West. [vi]

Apparently then, what often determines a country’s status as ‘democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’ is the extent to which it is seen as friend or foe of the West. The Suharto regime in Indonesia and Marcos in the Philippines were two other good examples of this principle. For a long time outside parties did not treat these regimes as authoritarian, though local populations knew better. Both were overthrown by popular uprisings, however in each case the effect of regime change has been limited, as the legacy of dictatorship still continues with devastating consequences for those seeking true democratization.[vii]

At what point can a country be characterized as ‘democratic’ after an authoritarian regime has been overthrown? Regime change is in itself no evidence of democratization. Since the UN-sponsored elections in Cambodia during 1993, for instance, the government has held power under a liberal democratic constitution. Yet in reality an extremely brutal and undemocratic regime still controls the country. Basic institutions such as an independent judiciary, civil service, and functioning parliament hardly exist. By way of another example, the West has welcomed changes made in China over recent decades, particularly those that have led to a market economy and new global alliances, especially with the United States. However, the party-based bureaucracy has remained firmly in control of all aspects of administration and decision making. Efforts to introduce legal reforms have to date had some small progress, but have had no greater effect that may lead to an independent judiciary there at any time soon. [viii]

A better way of assessing a shift towards democracy may be to study the creation and maintenance of institutions of justice. These are the organs that make a crucial difference between formal democracy and a truly democratic society. A citizen can participate in the political life and day to day affairs of a country only when he or she can challenge obstructions to participation. To do this requires truly independent judicial institutions with powers to provide effective remedies and the necessary resources to ensure their mandate. Additionally, the judiciary cannot work effectively unless there are similarly equipped and functioning police and prosecution agencies. With these conditions in place, the situation in all of the countries mentioned above would be very different.

Why is it that these agencies are so important? Elite-controlled parliaments are able to limit democracy to mere formalities by denying judicial challenges to their rule. They put up obstacles to prosecutions for abuse of power and corruption. Thus, politicians often pave the way for corruption in business and abuse in civil administration. The de-politicization of civil administration is one means by which challenges to elite power may be expanded, by way of judicial actions, prosecutions and criminal investigations.

Why is it that the combined role of the judiciary, prosecution agencies and police does not enter into many discussions on democratization? The mistake is in the artificial division between ‘legal’ issues, versus the ‘political’ issues, which are taken to mean elections and styles of governance. However, justice institutions are at the core of any system of governance, as they have the capacity to control political actors and keep them on a democratic path. Western observers often take these institutions for granted. In the West, justice institutions have developed along with political institutions over centuries. Therefore when ‘political’ discussions are held, the presence of effectively functioning justice institutions is simply assumed. It is wrong to make that assumption elsewhere. One of the major reasons that democratic institutions in post-colonial counties have failed is because the role of the justice institutions has been neglected. If this deficiency can be addressed, it may resolve many of the flaws in some of the countries mentioned above.

Conflicts between the state and individuals, between particular groups, and between the state and a particular group, often escalate into violence when judicial institutions are too weak to intervene, or are unable to do so impartially. Once such conflicts get under way, they are difficult to stop. The massive violence that has occurred throughout Asia since the 1950s is a testament to this. Lasting solutions cannot be found through mere political deals. Conflict resolution requires strong recognition of the role that a justice system must play in bringing about and maintaining a democratic society.

The absence or weakness of institutions of justice also affects civil administration, thereby fermenting or accelerating conflict. Where civil administration can be subjected to the judicial inquiry, it is obliged to be less arbitrary in its behaviour. Yet civil administration is scrutinized in only a handful of Asian countries. Democratization, however, will require that civil administration be brought under the watchful eye of a competent justice system.

Some positive examples of democratization in Asia and the Pacific

Having drawn this outline of how we may understand the concept of democratization, I now look into some of the democratic transitions and related conflicts in Asia and the Pacific. I begin with two relatively successful examples, one at a national level—South Korea—the other institutional—the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong. I then turn to an example of an ongoing struggle for social equality: the Dalit movement in India. After that I examine some of the avenues that have been used towards greater democratization: third party intervention, constitutional measures, human rights campaigns, and international forums. In the latter discussion I refer to: Cambodia, Fiji, the Philippines, Thailand and East Timor.

Among Asian nations, South Korea can be considered something of a democratization success story. A number of factors contributed to this success. To begin with, the movement towards democracy there was greatly bolstered by the popular movement that rose against the military dictatorship of 1980 to 1996. The resistance movement against the military immediately arose in response to the coup. The dramatic resistance of the Kwangju people and brutal suppression of their uprising spurred a nationwide movement that finally brought the two dictators to trial and conviction. But alongside this top-level transformation, institutional changes have taken place at every step in the administration, leading to reforms of the policing, prosecution and judicial systems. Transparency and accountability have become national ideals and have naturally had a direct impact on political life. State officials are increasingly appointed on the basis of merit rather than favour, indicating that the nation is attempting to break away from entrenched cultural habits that may debilitate democratic change. The institutional developments in South Korea have also not been imposed from above. They have grown out of an intense debate at all levels of a society in which the majority of people have begun to understand and appreciate democratic norms. One factor that has greatly contributed to this exchange of ideas is the communications revolution, as the use of computers and other electronic mediums is now widespread. As a result, numerous e-newsletters and other forums constantly keep people informed and offer avenues for participation.

The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong is an example of an institution that has been able to instill a culture of accountability and transparency throughout a large and vibrant society, ensuring a high level of economic development and efficient provision of basic services. The ICAC was set up in 1974 in response to public protests against the rampant corruption that plagued the public sector of Hong Kong at that time, when even ambulance attendants would demand tea money before picking up a sick person. Offering bribes to the right officials was also necessary to obtain access to public housing, schooling and other public services. Corrupt police officers covered up vices such as gambling and drug activities. With adequate resources, full autonomy, legislative will and popular support, the ICAC has carried out a widely publicized programme to eliminate corruption in Hong Kong via investigation, prevention and education. It has had marked success, as Hong Kong is now deemed one of the least corrupt places in the world. As corruption remains one of the major obstacles to democratization in many countries of Asia and the Pacific, the ICAC deserves serious examination and emulation by other states.

Under certain circumstances, third party intervention may be an effective step towards democratic solutions to deeply entrenched problems. Cambodia is a case in point. Beginning with the American bombing in 1969-70, Cambodia fell into an unparalleled catastrophe. The Paris Peace Accords of 1989 enabled the United Nations to supervise the cessation of conflict, the holding of elections and writing of a new constitution. However, in this case the third party—-the international community through the United Nations—-did not have the resolve to continue with its intervention until it was well established. Cambodian society had been utterly destroyed by war and famine. The mere writing of a democratic constitution, as discussed above, by no means guaranteed its implementation. The United Nations failed to fulfill its mandate and help establish basic institutions of justice, such as an independent judiciary, competent police, an impartial prosecution system and a functioning civil service. A decade on, none of these institutions are functioning effectively, and as such they lack public confidence and support.

The UN also intervened in East Timor after the people’s fierce resistance to Indonesian occupation finally succeeded. The new democracy must face massive poverty and widespread social problems left by decades of civil war and misrule. Its natural resources are plentiful, but are threatened by large economic powers. On the occasion of the first year of the newly elected government of East Timor, Shannana Gusmao, the President of East Timor, at a BBC interview admitted the economic situation of the country is very bad despite the freedom achieved through the elections. The justice system also must be rebuilt. Among local people there is a feeling that “there is no justice in East Timor.” [ix]

Another avenue for third party intervention, addressing crimes by authoritarian regimes, is by extending the jurisdiction of international judicial institutions to countries in Asia. To date, Cambodia, East Timor, Fiji, Mongolia, Nauru, the Republic of Korea and Samoa have all ratified the Treaty for the International Criminal Court (ICC).[x] The ICC is likely to prove a very useful instrument for democratization in the region over coming decades.

In some instances, constitutional measures have been used in order to safeguard democracy. In Fiji, for instance, a coup in 2000 ousted the democratically elected government. In an interesting move, the coup’s legitimacy was challenged in court. The challenge was upheld and the coup brought to a peaceful end via constitutional means. The domestic legal maneuvering against the coup was strengthened by enormous international condemnation. Thus the coup gained neither local nor international legitimacy and it could not be sustained. Indeed, the importance of using both internal legal mechanisms and also building international pressure against undemocratic actions is increasingly understood in Asia and the Pacific.

A number of other recent examples illustrate how a constitutional approach may be effective. The removal of President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines on corruption charges was one instance of constitutional powers being used in response to popular pressure. Estrada resigned in January 2001 after prolonged controversy arising from impeachment proceedings on charges of bribes related to gambling. These proceedings were accompanied by mass protests against the president that were in their last stages backed by religious leaders and former presidents. In Thailand, the 1997 Constitution and establishment of the Constitutional Court of Thailand had also attempted to expand the avenues for protection of democratic values. In a response to the waves of popular frustration felt over decades of coups, counter coups, attempted coups, political instability, cronyism and patronage politics, the new constitution imposed anti-vote buying and anti-corruption measures. It established new institutions to oversee and control authorities and to enhance democracy. The constitution also introduced measures to ensure the rights and liberties of citizens, and ended the feudal culture that had dominated Thai political life in earlier decades in which there was no concept of rights.

Perhaps one of the most innovative constitutional approaches to correct the state institutions of some entrenched practices of corruption and politicization is in the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka. This amendment was passed in 2001 as a way to stop political interference in the working of several important government institutions. It established the Constitutional Council and several commissions: the Public Service Commission, Election Commission, Judicial Service Commission and National Police Commission. The Constitutional Council appoints commissioners to the other four bodies. Once appointed, the commissioners have the power of appointments, promotions, dismissals and disciplinary control of the personnel in their respective institutions. The aim of this amendment is to deny cabinet ministers the right to make these appointments, as they typically appoint persons on political grounds rather than objective criteria. These commissions have very wide powers and as they are constitutional bodies they can be abolished only by way of another constitutional amendment, which requires a two-thirds majority in parliament.

Increasingly, human rights measures are being adopted as a means to consolidate the rule of law and democracy. Many countries in Asia and the Pacific have introduced human rights bills. Some have provisions to enforce these rights. However as compared to some South Asian countries, in Southeast Asia constitutional developments for enforcement of human rights are insignificant.

Certain movements and organizations are also using United Nations forums and other international bodies to canvass for greater democratization in particular countries. Given the kind of experiences referred to above, an increasingly common belief is that local pressures are not in themselves sufficient to gain a greater measure of democracy. Many organizations now routinely approach the UN Commission for Human Rights and other UN agencies and committees. Representatives of these bodies often pay visits to different countries, collect information and take up issues with the governments concerned, which may in turn lead to steps for institutional reforms.

Conclusion

Democracy must bring benefits and not costs. Mere formal democracy has not brought such benefits. Democratization must emphasize improvements in institutions of justice and civil administration, rather than electioneering. Reforms in these institutions can realize equality, the core value of democracy.

There is no automatic transition to democracy among the countries of Asia and the Pacific. Those societies that have sought democratization have inevitably faced many complex problems, which in turn have led to numerous, sometimes bloody, conflicts. Comprehensive study of these experiences is very enriching, and necessary for an understanding of the complex processes at work, if meaningful institutions that will enhance the local possibilities for democratization are to be developed. Only critical studies of actual situations—-but a few of which have been mentioned above—-can guide measures that may help to solve the manifold conflicts plaguing regional transitions towards democracy.

However, global developments are threatening democratization and limiting the initiatives of local actors. The dominant global ideology of recent times, though it uses the word ‘democratization,” implies something very different: domination. This is the enemy of democracy. Local partners in this global ideology threaten the rudiments of the rule of law and undermine democratic institutions of justice. As a result, even past achievements are now being eroded. More than ever, those persons with a commitment to the spread of genuine democracy must be critically aware of the dangers inherent in this trend.

End Notes

i. B. R. Ambedkar, ‘On the completion of the third reading and adoption of the Constitution of India’, in Thus Spoke Ambedkar: Selected Speeches, vol. 2, Bhagwan Das (ed.), Buddhist Publishing House, Jalandhar, undated, p. 188. [Back to content ]

ii . Ambedkar’s prediction has been vindicated in contemporary India. There, the Dalit movement continues to be engaged in a struggle towards democratization, against centuries-old social inequalities. The Dalits, formerly known as ‘untouchables’, form about 16 per cent of India’s population. In a society entirely based on caste hierarchy, to be untouchable was to be without caste, sub-human. While the lowest within the caste hierarchy have over centuries suffered great discrimination, the position of the outcastes has been far worse. Over the last hundred years there have been many attempts to address the most extreme aspects of this inequality. The Dalit movement has adopted a twofold approach, on the one hand using constitutional and legal means to break down discrimination and enhance equality, on the other, educating their own people to be aware of their rights and to see and think of themselves as social equals with others. Constitutionally, some affirmative actions were adopted to overcome discrimination, reserving places in educational institutions and state jobs for Dalits and other traditionally excluded groups. Untouchability was outlawed and other measures introduced to address caste-based atrocities. These measures have led to improvements. Self-education programmes and self-respect movements have broken the silence these people were forced into in the past. They themselves have become participants in the democratization of their country.

However, Dalit assertions of dignity and equality have brought with them new conflicts. The segments of society that had for centuries benefited from the subservient attitude of vast numbers of people have turned to violence in order to subdue the more vocal and organized Dalits. This has affected the nature of political parties and even the nature of political leadership in India. Law enforcement agencies too have often tried to defend the traditional power structure against this movement. But whatever their efforts, the growing participation of people in the nation’s political and social life who in the past had not participated at all has in itself exposed the flaws in India’s supposed democracy, and indicated where changes must be made. In a similar way, ‘minorities’ have become powerful forces for change in many parts of Asia and the Pacific.[ Back to content ]

iii . For more detailed discussion see, Basil Fernando, Demoralization and Hope: A Comparative Study of the Ideas of N. F. S. Gruntvig of Denmark and B. R. Ambedkar of India. Asian Human Rights Commission, Hong Kong SAR, 2000. [Back to content]

iv. C. G. Weeramantry, Equality And Freedom, Vishva Lekha Publishers, Sarvodaya, 1999, p. 3. The author was a Vice President of the International Court of Justice, The Hague. [ Back to content ]

v . For further comments see, ‘Open letter to the global human rights community: Let us rise to article 2 of the ICCPR’, article 2, vol. 1, no. 1, February 2002, pp. 2–4. Also available online at www.article2.org . [ Back to content]

vi . For a detailed study on social control in Singapore see, Christoper Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, Macmillan Press, London, 1994. For more details on repression in Malaysia see the chapters on ‘Administrative Detention in Malaysia’ and ‘Fair Trial In Malaysia’ in Decline of Fair Trail in Asia Asian Human Rights Commission, Hong Kong SAR, 2000. In the same publication see the chapter on ‘Problems in Fair Trial in the Philippines’. [ Back to content ]

vii . For a useful discussion of some problems in the rule of law in Indonesia, see ‘The Independence and Reform of the Judiciary in Indonesia’, in Ruler’s Law: The Report of the International Commission of Jurists Mission to Indonesia, International Commission of Jurists, October 1999. [ Back to content ]

viii . For an excellent discussion on criminal procedure in China see, Empty Promises: Human Rights Protections and China’s Criminal Procedure Law in Practice, Human Rights in China, Hong Kong, 2001. [ Back to content ]

ix . From the author’s personal notes during a training programme held in Dili, East Timor, 15-21 January 2001. [ Back to content ]

x . Coalition for the International Criminal Court website, http://www.iccnow.org/countyinfo/worldratifications.html. [Back to content ]