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11 February 1999
Ms. N. Font de Berlioz
United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances
Room D-121, U.N. Centre for Human Rights
Palais de Nation
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland
In Section II of the document Economic and
Social Council Document GENERAL E/CN4/1998/43 (dated 12 January
1998) Information Concerning Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances in Various Countries Reviewed by the Working Group,
the Sri Lankan situation is discussed from paragraphs 341 to 350.
1. In paragraph 341 the Working Group states: "The Working Group also wishes
to remind the Government of its obligation to investigate all
outstanding cases of enforced disappearances and in this respect
looks forward to receiving the reports of the three presidential
commissions of inquiry."
2. The reports of the three Presidential Commissions of
Inquiry, [The Commissions on Involuntary Removal or Disappearance
of Persons] have been issued to the public and we believe the
Working Group to have studied the contents and recommendations of
these reports.
3. In paragraph 347, The Working Group states: "In the reports of the three
presidential commissions which investigated past allegations of
disappearances, the Government has stated that the perpetrators
will be prosecuted." It must be noted that the
Commissions referred to are fact finding commissions. They can
only make recommendations for prosecutions and such
recommendations are not necessarily binding. Further, being fact
finding inquiries, the three Commissions' inquiries do not amount
to criminal investigations. The Commissions did not have the
resources to conduct criminal investigations. As far as the
personal liability of offenders is concerned, the prosecution of
cases requires the conduct of criminal investigations. In the
absence of such investigations, the alleged perpetrators may
claim that there is no evidence against them. In fact some have
already done so. Thus, between the inquiries of the Commissions
and the prosecution of offenders there is the need for criminal
investigations. So long as there are no such investigations there
can be no prosecution with regard to tens of thousands of
disappearances. The Working Group needs to pay attention to this
real situation. Unfortunately, such awareness and attention are
not reflected in paragraph 347 cited above. We annex a submission
made by the Asian Human Rights Commission to the continuing
Commission of Inquiry into Disappearance of Persons relating to
this matter of criminal investigations.
The following comment from one of the Commission Reports is
relevant:
"It is unreasonable to
expect that the further evidence required for the identification
to pin individual liability in the "vertical
structures" would be available to the petitioners before us.
(E) Only Persons who were within the system itself
either decision-makers, participants, or as witnesses to same
could provide such evidence. The political dimension of the
events in respect of which responsibility is sought to be
identified is very clear, however from the few witnesses with
personal knowledge of the times who came before the Commission.
We have analysed their evidence in the foregoing paragraphs.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and some
Latin American ones have provisions enabling the admission of
participation and consequent amnesty, to witnesses who came
before the Commission.(page 49) (Emphasis Ours - ALRC)
Finally, on the issue of "Responsibility", a
distinction needs to be drawn at all times in the identification
of "those responsible" where the State is under the
control of a civil government, as in our case, from the situation
where the State is in the control of a military regime. Whatever may
be said in support of an identification and punishment of a few
military leaders in the situation where the state is in the
control of a military regime such a limited exercise can never
suffice or be condoned in the situation of a state which is under
the control of a civil government."
(page 49) (Emphasis ours - ALRC).
4. The following findings from the three Commissions are also
very relevant for further observations and recommendations the
Working Group may make this year:
(a) Total number of inquiries 26,935; Completed 16,800;
being investigated 10,135
That the total number of cases inquired into by the Commission
amounts to-16,800. Further the continuing Commission, which has
mandate up to end of April 1999, has received 10,135 more
complaints into which it is investigating now, according to an
interim report submitted to the government by the Commission on
31 December 1998.
(b) Systems involvement and a systematic attempt to keep
these deaths/disappearances from being recorded:
"A feature that struck us most forcefully in our
inquiries was the utmost care that had been taken not only by
individual perpetrators but also by the system itself to present
these occurrences from being reflected in the official records of
the country. Starting with the refusal of the local police to
record complaints-which was a general feature in all three
provinces, through the blatant use of vehicles without number
plates, right up to the refusal it allow the bereaved to take
possessions of corpses identified by them let alone obtaining
death certificates in respect of them, there is clear evidence of
a systematic attempt to keep these deaths/disappearances from
being recorded in the official annals. A nation which takes pride
in the fact of having a recorded history of thousands of years
should not leave a dark patch." (page-xv) "They exemplify a
generalised practice, which in its turn warrants the reasonable
inference that this practice denotes a generalised direction NOT
to investigate such incident."
(Page 55)
(c) The word "disappearance" is only a euphemism
for the death caused by extra-judicial killings:"In the
7761 cases (88.8%) inquired into the bodies of the victims
were found only in 1513 (19.4%) cases. Others have
disappeared without a trace. However in the given context,
the word "disappearance" is only a euphemism for
the death caused by extra-judicial killings." (page 27)
(d) State
responsibility: what had happened went for
beyond what could be attributed to a break-down of relations
between the particular perpetrators and the victim. While seeking to identify the person who had
been the immediate link in bringing the 'system' into
operation against them, they would describe the prevalent
situation graphically and in concrete terms."(page 30)
"The common features of the nration by thousands of
humble petitioners in respect of thousands of abductions and
disappearances, bore powerful witness to the fact that what
we were looking at was an orchestrated phenomenon and not a
series of isolated instances explicable in terms of
"excesses" by individual transgressors" (page
32)
(e) Clandestine nature of the operation-and torture:
"A valuable pointer to the fate that befell many of
the abducted is to be found in the evidence of the many
returned detainees who have come before the Commission
whether as petitioners on their own behalf or as witnesses to
the fate of others. They constitute a powerful credible body
of evidence on:
(i) The serious, often fatal injuries suffered by the
prevalent practices of torture by the authorities with
the attendant issue of disposal of bodies.
(ii) The transport of detainees to undisclosed
destinations in circumstances loudly speaking to the
clandestine nature of the journey-Removal of number
plates/ affixing of false number plates to the vehicles,
use of fire arms, implements for digging old tyres taken
along, on these journeys being inconsistent with the
object of the journey being a lawful one.
(iii) In some instances "confession" to
participation in such "extermination" under
duress etc." (page 33)
(f) Age group:
Out of the 16,800 cases recorded in the reports by the
three commissions 14.83% are persons below the age of 19; A
further 28.05% are below the age of 24. (this does not
include the figures from among the 10,135 cases that are
being investigated by the continuing commission.)
(g) Number of disappearances caused by state agents:
Out of 7239 cases of disappeared persons, 4858 are by
agents of the state/para military groups in collaboration
with them.( page 29 )
(h) Abduction instead of arrest showed intention for
killing:
"That "abduction" rather than
"arrest" was the preferred method of operation, is
a clear indication that physical elimination of the persons
taken-in was not ruled out. Given, additionally the
unrecorded nature of the initial abduction and detention the
temptation to adopt 'elimination' as a practice was
inevitable."( page 32)
"The Elimination of "potential groups" had
become a permitted tactic of counter-subversion. The
petitioners before us spoke of this from their personal
experience.
* "Broilers"
A practice of keeping in unrecorded detention
"stocks" of detainees of a certain age-group, who had
been taken into custody in combing-out operations or casually off
the road/beach was evident in several instances from the evidence
of returned detainees. These persons then disappeared without
trace after being taken out of the camp generally following on a
subversive act that had caused loss of life or damage to property
damage or on the camp being dismantled. Given the practice of
'reprisal killings' sinister significance attached to these
disappearances from State custody. Hence the slang of the period
:
"Broiler" = an article for consumption."
(page 32)
(i) Mutilated bodies at public places:
The evidence of members of the public was that mutilated
bodies at public places was a common sight. (page34)
(j) Mass graves:
Mass Graves came into existence contemporaneously. The
inference as to who were the creators is inescapable when the
massive logistics entailed, not to mention their proximity to
locations under state control, are taken into consideration.
(page 34)
"The existence of twelve Mass Graves have been reported
to this Commission. They are:
1. The Hokandara Mass Grave
2. The Essella School Mass Grave
3. The Wavulkelle Mass Grave
4. The Walpita Government Farm Mass Grave (2 to 4 are in the
Gampaha District)
5. Ambagahahenakanda Mass Grave
6. Bemmulla Mass Grave
7. Kottawakella, Yakkalamulla Mass Grave - Galle District
8. The Dickwella Mass Grave at Heendeliya
9. Diyadawakelle, Deniyaya, Mass Grave
10. Wilpita Akuressa Mass Grave (8 to 10 are in the Matare
District)
11. Angkumbura Mass Grave - Matale District
12. Suriyakanda Mass Grava - Monaragala District."(page
117)
(k) "The political dimension:
Acknowledgement of the political dimension inherent in the
scene revealed by the evidence before this Commission, is a
necessary response to the trust and confidence reposed in the
Commission by the thousands of witnesses who spoke openly
placing their hard-earned experience, and perceptions on
record.
(i) The Public Perception.- The
Public Perception was that the conspicuous spectacle of
impunity could not have existed without the complicity of
the political leadership. The various allegations before
us of the close participation of the local politicians in
the exercise, the various allegations of 'informers' who
functioned as the channel of mis-information from the
politicians to the security Forces, the allegation of
'Lists' of names of political enemies being supplied to
the Security Forces for elimination, are all based on
this perception. (Emphasis ours - ALRC)
(ii) Confirmation by 2 Senior Officials. - This perception of the petitioners has
found confirmation in the evidence of two Senior
officials of that time, one of the Police the other of
the Army, who have given evidence under oath on the role
played by politicians of the governing party in the
counter-subversion exercise, the practice of the
preparation of 'Lists' of names by them, and the issue by
them of illegal orders, for execution by the Police and
Army respectively
Mr. E. E. B. Perera, Inspector General of Police,
01.08.1988 to 18.11.1993:
When the second insurrection-wave struck the Police Force was
dependent on informers. Hence the phenomenon of Members of
Parliament who were providing the political direction to the
anti-subversive drive being supplied with 'Lists' of names by
informers, who in turn passed them over to the Forces and the
Police. In 1971, the political authority at District level was
required to give support to the Forces. By the second
insurrection the Provincial Councils had come into operation.
There was an administrative direction that the Deputy Inspector
General (DIG) should be subjected to the control of the political
authority usually the Chief Minister, notwithstanding the fact
that Police powers had not been developed to the Provincial level
under the 13th Amendment.
This confirms the practice
of 'Lists', whose source was the local politician. It also
clarifies the path by which the Security Forces came to be used
in the narrow interests of particular politicians.
Further it makes clear that
the police had to put into effect directions that were clearly
outside the law.(Emphasis ours-ALRC)
Lt. General Rohan Daluwatta, Commander Sri Lankan
Army, has stated
While I was co-ordinating Officer, Ratnapura certain political
pressures were brought to bear on me. I was given a list of names
with the direction to take them into custody, that they were
JVPers. I received the List from a former Minister.... When I
checked the list with the Police, I came to know that they were
SLFPers. I was told, that area could be cleared were I to catch
them.
(iii) The
use of the Forces and Police in the Narrow Interests of
Politicians.- This was spoken of by two
Inspectors-General of Police in their evidence before us.
Mr. L. D. G. Cyril Herath was IGP December 1985 to
31.07.88. Mr. Herath said:
In the promotion of Udugampola, SP over 15 more senior
officers, to the rank of DIG, I saw the portents of the plan to
use the Police Force in the narrow interests of politicians. It
was clear to me that alternative structures of command were being
put in place within the Police force for the purpose. I realised
that a system of promotions to this effect was being put into
operation.
W. B. Rajaguru-IGP 29.07.95 to-date. Mr. Rajaguru, the
present IGP stated:
I am aware that there were specific instances where rapid
promotions were given. One was that of Mr. Premadasa Udugampola
who was an Inspector of Police in 1977 and had rapid journey
through the ranks of A.S.P., S.P., Senior S.P., and became Deputy
Inspector General by about 1988 (in 10 years time). At that time
it was mentioned that this officer had moved over 180 other
officers at different stages.
Among the rank and file there was a degree of disillusion and
heart-burn, for there were persons who had become able to move
upward quite freely within the police. This disillusion affected
discipline.
A specific instance I will
give is the Mulkirigala By- election. At this time found that
contrary to specific orders made at Head Quarters there were
certain police officers moving about the electorate. At this time
I was DIG Greater Colombo and Southern Range. I found that Mr.
Udugampola, then SSP Gampaha had moved into Mulkirigala
electorate on his own, He had brought with him several officers
in charge from his division. There were no orders for him or
other officers in charge to perform any duties within the
electorate. Later, there were many complaints received about
bands of police intimidating the public and committing acts of
thuggery; and there was evidence that the police had beaten up
voters to prevent them from going to vote.(Emphasis ours- ALRC)
My experience is not limited to the day of election, This
feature I have described was continued police thuggery. The
complaints came from Kirama Weeraketiya, Walasmulla and
Middeniya. It was organised and widespread
We have also noted that
former Inspector General of Police Mr. E. E. B. Perera in his evidence before the
Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Disappearance of persons,
unlawful Arrest of Persons and the Operation of Places of
Detention at the Batalanda Housing Scheme" had stated that
There were several occasions
when we had to put into effect directions that were clearly
outside the law. Not just one occasion. It was undoubtedly due to
the fact of undue interference by the Executive that Ronnie
Gunasinghe was not taken into custody. (Emphasis ours-ALRC)
Some instances of the political control of the structures
follow.
(i) The
Lakshman Perera Case: Lakshman Perera was a
dramatist and poet and Pradeshiya Sabha MP of the Governing
Party. Soon after posters appeared in and around Colombo
advertising his satirical play termed "WHO IS HE? WHAT IS HE
DOING?", he was abducted from his home and
disappeared. His wife's identification of the abductors is as
follows:
I do not see personal enmity to be the cause. This abduction
is an indication of the hollow nature of the profession of
democracy by the ruling party. We were at the police station very
shortly after the abduction, but the police displayed utter
indifference.
(ii) The
Richard de Soyza Case : The case of Richard de
Soyza Journalist and broadcaster (who was abducted on 18.02.1990.
is another instance.)
(iii) The
Adiruppu Street Case : A UNP organiser of a
Colombo Central area was abducted by an armed gang who came in
modern vehicles in the night. The incident, apparently, is a
consequence of an intra-UNP leadership struggle. His wife giving
evidence before the Commission said:
There was no UNP high-up who didn't know my husband. And yet
no one would move in the matter of his abduction and
disappearance.
The disappearance from
police custody of suspects regarding the assassination of a
political leader during this period is a striking instance of the
practice under consideration.(Emphasis ours-ALRC)
(i) The Disappearance from Police Custody of Suspects
Regarding the Assassination of a Political leader: The Vijaya
Kumaratunga Case
Vijaya Kumaratunge, Leader of the SLMP, was assassinated on
16.02.88. Lionel Ranasinghe and Tarzon Weerasinghe were taken
into Police custody as the suspected assassin and accomplice
respectively. The mother of Lionel Ranasinghe and the sister of
Tarzon Weerasinghe, have stated to the Commission that these
persons disappeared from Police custody while they were detained
at the 4th floor of the CID Headquarters in Colombo. Tarzon
Weerasinghe's sister produced to the Commission a letter from the
ICRC representative who visited this place of detention had been
informed by a co-detainee that this person had disappeared while
in the custody of the CID in March 1990.
The Commission was unable to summon the said witness as the
ICRC informed the Commission that they are unable to disclose the
co-detainee's identity to the Commission. The CID's position to
the IRP had been one of the denial of detention of Tarzon
Weerasinghe. The mother of Lionel Weerasinghe stated that she
visited her son in the custody of the CID and the last time she
visited him was 16.09.89. She was then informed that he was in
remand custody. Both petitioners have had no further information
about these persons' fate until they read newspaper accounts of
the evidence trasnpiring at the Special Presidential Commission
of Inquiry into the assassination of Vijaya Kumaratunga.The
finding of the Commission of Inquiry into the assassination of
Vijaya Kumaratunga on the disappearance of Lionel Ranasinghe from
custody is as follows:-The preceding account clearly shows that
the conduct of the police regarding the transfer of the suspect
from the CID to Homagama, his interrogation for five days at
Homagama, the ambush of the police party and the escape of the
suspect is laced with falsity at every turn. The evidence of the
respective police officers stretches credulity to breaking point
and more.That Commission's finding on the disappearance of Tarzon
Weerasinghe from custody is as follows:- The evidence is, that
Tarzon Weerasinghe was not seen alive after his detention in the
CID.It is in evidence before us that no disciplinary inquiry or
action of any kind was taken against the errant police officers.
The Masssacre on the Eve of the Presidential Election988 at SLFP
Chief Organiser"s Residence
NF was the SLFP Chief Organiser for Panadura at the
Presidential Election of December 19, 1988. His residence was the
centre for nominating polling agents and other campaign work. On
December 18, 1988 he secured the release of some of his
supporters who bid been arrested by the police on the false
pretence that they were JVP and returned borne around 10.30 a.m.
where several members of the party Youth League including the
Branch Secretary and the treasurer had assembled. Within minutes
the residence was sprayed with bullets. Eight of his supporters
had been killed on the spot; another had succumbed to his
injuries later. The police had arrived within minutes at his
house and given him protection. On the previous morning, December
17, two persons clad in army uniform had called over at his house
and had inquired about the state of his security. After
requesting for some posters of the SLFP Presidential candidate
"to be put up when she wins" They had identified
themselves as personnel attached to a temporary army camp at
Wadduwe.
NF: Even
after such and incident when so many people were killed in my own
house the culprits have not been found. There were posters
against me by the JVP. But I had no direct threats from them.
My House is situated two or
three miles from the police station. But they arrived within a
few minutes at my house. When I reflect on all these matters I
think the Army was responsible for this incident and that the
police also was aware of it. (Emphasis ours-ALRC)
This incident is a clear indication of the political dimension
of the use of the structure.
(vi) The Promotion of some Security and police officers found
to be in breath of fundamental rights by the Supreme Courts:
When the Supreme Court in a 5-Judge Bench decision found a
Viharadhipathi had been prevented from exercising his fundamental
rights to "Freedom of Speech and Expression including
Publication" by a police officer, the state media announcing
the decision that evening announced also that the said police
officer had been given a promotion. The incident that had
violated the Viharadhipathi's fundamental rights was the seizure
of posters objecting to the Referendum, at the time of the
Referendum 1982.
The same juxtaposition is discernible in the circumstances of
the failure to investigate, prosecute or hold disciplinary
inquiry into instances where the courts has found a Forces or
Police officer to have acted in breath of a fundamental right or
to be responsible in a Habeas Corpus Application.
The inescapable and
irresistible inference deducible from the entirety of the proved
facts in this case is that in actual fact no such applications
for detention orders and detention orders were in existence on
the third of September 1988. But that these documents were
fabricated later with collusion between the first accused and
witness Udugampola for the avowed object and authority on an
otherwise illegal arrest, illegal detention and the illegal
removal of a mutilated Lyanarachchi to Sapugaskanda so as to
mislead and deceive the ultimate deciding authority as to when
these injuries were in fact inflicted. (Emphasis ours-ALRC)
The court went on to state, as part of its judgement, as
follows:
It is the fervent hope of this court that the Hon. Attorney
General the law enforcement Agencies and the executive will in
the near future probe and investigate into the issue as to who
caused this death, using the varied facts, matters and
information disclosed in these court proceedings.
No steps, as directed by court, have been taken to this date.
Nor dies the service record of Udugampola show that any steps
have been taken by way of disciplinary inquiry or any other v.
this officer departmentally. By the time the judgement was
delivered in the Liyanarachchi case, 18.03.91 Udugampola was Head
of the newly established Bureau of Special Operations, on
presidential directive.
Case of Sunil of Obeysekerapura
The Case of Sunil of Obeysekerapura: Sunil"s abduction
and disappearance occurred in the context of the inner party
rivalry that occurred at the Colombo Municipal Council Elections
1991. Sunil, a strong UNPer and friend of one 'Malu Nihal' a
leader of the local under world-gang, fell out with Malu Nihal as
they supported the rival UNP candidates who contested the
election. Sunil was abducted by police officers attached to the
Bureau of Special Operations. His mother traced him to the office
of the BSO.
The Bureau of Special Operations was a special unit of the
police established according to its mandate to 'fight
narcotism" corruption, smuggling and terrorism", with
operational jurisdiction island-wide, which was set up in January
1991 on Presidential direction with DIG Premadasa Udugampola as
its Head.
There was no allegation that Sunil was engaged in
"narcotics, corruption, smuggling or terrorism" when he
was abducted by the B. S. O.
All dissent had come to
be equated to "subversion".
The petitioners before
the Commission perceived this clearly. They said:
My husband let the SLFP hold the General Election meetings in
our compound when others wouldn't. They came in a jeep in the
night time and abducted him. My complaint to the Inspector
General of Police was referred for inquiry to the same officer,
now, Asst. Supdt. of police of the area.
I know the murder of my 18 year old President's Scout son just
after his return from an international Scout jamboree was by the
Army, at the local politician's behest. The local Army Commandant
who ordered, and the local politico who put him up to it, are
both equally guilty
When my 3 brothers, one of them the SLFP Branch President and
all 3 quite outstanding, were abducted, it wasn't to keep them
alive. It was to stifle political discussion.
The then President of the Bar
Association of Sri Lanka in his evidence to the Commission brought this out
clearly from his analysis of the Lawyers who were abducted or
were killed out-right during this period. Lawyers who filed
Habeas Corpus applications, who worked with Christian Service
Organations in the Free Trade Zone for the welfare of workers,
Lawyers who appeared in Trade Union Matters, in legal aid work,
met with the same fate. (Emphasis ours -ALRC)
A large number of lawyers who were handling Habeas Corpus and
fundamental rights matters were killed by unidentified gun men.
C. L. was handling a large number of Habeas Corpus Cases in
respect of persons who had been taken into custody arid
disappeared. Mr. N. N. of Gampaha had been involved in a large
number of Habeas Corpus Cases, but at the date of his killing he
was not involved in these. Mr. K. A. who was killed had been
involved in a large number of cases in respect of University
students who had been taken into custody and could not be traced.
He was also active in the Sarvodaya Legal Aid Centre, Mr. S. K.
at the time of his death was engaged as a Junior Counsel in a
Magistrate Court Case in Theldeniya, where 7 Police Officers of
Theldeniya Police were accused on killing a school boy in a
demonstration. Prior to the murder of S. K. his clerk and another
lawayer's clerk who were eye-witnesses to the shooting of the
school boy, had been killed. A delegation of the BASL met H. E.
the President of Sri Lanka and requested that the Police and Army
personnel should come to an agreement that BASL would be informed
with 24 hours of a lawyer being taken into custody. H. E. The
President agreed to this. The agreement with the three service
Commanders was signed on 21.08.89. On several occasions lawyers
were threatened and taken into custody and subsequently released
at my intervention. Mr. G K. who was practicing in Gampaha was
not involved in Habeas Corpus matters, but he was involved in
Trade Union Work for SEDEC, a Catholic welfare organisation in
the Katunayake Free Trade Zone. Mr. B. of the Negombo Bar was
helping in the work of the Movements for Inter-Racial Justice and
equality (MIRJE) a general feature of the abductions of lawyers
was the fact that they were carried out by persons in civil
coming in un-marked vehicles. This would be followed by my
telephoning the Secretary/Defence who would say: I will ring some
People and ring you back; thereafter he would phone to say: Your
man is safe.
8. An attitude of considering only one's own human rights as
'Rights' had came into existence
The Secretary Movement for Development and Democratic Rights
(MDDR) an umbrella organisation of voluntary organisations who
work in the field of political, civil socio-economic and cultural
rights, stated in evidence:
At the time terrorism came
to be used as a political tool in the North, the state's view was
that it could be brought under control by slaughter. The
resultant State Terrorism could have only restricted operation in
the North. But within the Police and Army and even the Govt. the
prevalent view was that killing was an essential tool, and
machinery to this purpose, to be put to use at any time
whatsoever, was set up by the state. This machinery was set up in
a frame-work that couldn't be challenged via the courts. The only
legal weapon available against abduction and killings was the
writ of Habeas Corpus. If the inquests and investigations
requisites under ordinary law operated, the law would not have
been reduced to this state of helplessness. Emergency Regulation
55 permitted a burial without on inquest EF55's
"message" to the Security Forces was that a human body
was no more than that of a dog or other animal. All this took
place in the context of an attitude of considering only your own
Human Rights as "Rights". (Emphasis ours-ALRC)
This was reflected among lawyers also. On one occasion our
orgnisation proposed that as a principle we should oppose all
Murder, by whomsoever. Those who opposed this took up the
position that what was necessary was condemnation of killings by
state forces and not killings by others. When we showed that this
was not only incorrect in principle but was in itself a threat to
Human Rights, there were threats to our lives. And as they were
in a position to carry them out, these were not idle threats
either. (pages 34-42)
"The Minister of State for Defence on the
Government's Policies
Finally it is the responsibility of this Commission to place
on record the words in Parliament of the Minister of Defence.
A. On 25.01.90 speaking in Parliament in the debate to extend
the Emergency, the Minister stated as follows :
I know that there are abuses black sheep in the Police
Department and the Forces, but by and large the Services and the
Police are highly disciplined and they have done a good job for
all of us-not only for us, but for all of us. I am concerned
about the abuses and I am personally following up the action that
is being taken against the culprits. I have asked for a list of
name of persons in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the
Police who have been accused of murder, extortion, rape, robbery
and connivance with the JVP. I will follow up action until they
are punished and put in their places. No, matter who they are, no
influence will be tolerated.
We are in the process of
cleaning up the local Mafia. That is why we want the Emergency
Extended for a little more time to finish up all this also. You
cannot do these things under the normal law. (Emphasis ours-ALRC) It takes a lot of time. By the time my good
friends who are lawyers take time to solve these things the match
will be over (Interruption). We have finished the first eleven
and the second eleven. Now we are tackling the under fourteen
fellows.
1. There is no record of follow-up action against any person
in any Army, Navy Etc. in respect of the series of acts that
constitute a disappearance.
2. "We have finished the first eleven and the second
eleven. Now we are tackling the under 14 fellows" is seen to
have an almost literal meaning. Not a single leader of the JVP
was brought to trial after the arrest of thirteen out of fourteen
Members of the Polit Bureau in the period November-December 1989.
None of them are alive." (Page 42)
(l) The issue of impunity:
The entire chapter of the Commission's report on The Issue of
Impunity deserves special and careful consideration. It deals
with the threat disappearances pose to democracy.
"No circumstance what so ever whether a threat of war, a
state of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked to justify enforced disappearances.i
To the extent that a society
or government dismisses the principle of accountability as
unnecessary, it under-mines its possibility of becoming a true
democracy, in which citizens can feel confident that their rights
are firmly protected.ii (page 50)(Emphasis ours- ALRC)
"The Spectacle of Impunity
* The climate of impunity was so tangible as far as the
witnesses before this Commission were concerned that many of them
did not even trouble to list its features. This Commission
discovered that the features ranged from the most spectacular and
sensational to the most mundane disregard for the Rule of Law.
These features included the sight of scavenging dogs feeding on
mutilated bodies left in piles on the road-side.
* the sight of 'tyre-pyres' with bodies set alight on them,
(and still more gruesome wearing 'necklace' of a burning tyre
leading to the reflection was it a corpse of a living person who
had been so garlanded)
* the sight of vehicles moving around with no number-plates of
obviously false ones, without check by traffic police of soldiers
manning the many road blocks.
* the experience-one's own or of a neighbour, friend of
relation-f the violent entry into one's home at any time of the
day or night of heavily armed men who forcibly abducted the
males-most particularly the youth taking them in as public a
manner as possible, never to return.
* the knowledge, common to all, that the attempts of the
relatives to inform the police would be unsuccessful; that the
complaint if recorded it all would be but of a disappearance
only, leaving out all the material particulars disclosed by the
complainant.
* the knowledge that not one jot of attention would be paid in
official quarters despite the regular newspaper reports that
showed opposition MPs raising the matter of disappearances in
Parliament, tabling the lists of the disappeared.
* the knowledge, worst of all, shared by the whole community,
that there would be no official acknowledgement, not one
perpetrator punished, even though these were not the acts of a
foreign invader.
This was the picture conjured up again and again in the
evidence of petitioners before the Commission from all quarters
of the South, West and Sabaragamuwa Provinces, though the rates
of incidence varied from place to place. From the homogeneous nature of the
evidence before us, Your Commissioners are confident that this
will be the picture revealed before all three Commissions
appointed by Your Excellency.(Emphasis ours - ALRC)
(pages 50-51)
Conclusions:
Conclusion 1
Even the above considerations, which are only a small part of
the serious matters raised by the three Sri Lankan Presidential
Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or
Disappearance of Persons, show an organised attempt on the part
of the political leadership of the regime in power at the time to
cause the disappearances of tens of thousands of persons through
the operations of State officers and those working with them.
These thousands of killings were done after arrest or abduction
by such persons under a nation-wide network with powers not to
keep any records. Most bodies were burnt or disposed of in rivers
by the persons working for these agencies. Some of the bodies
were exhibited at roadsides. None of these acts can come under
legitimate actions of a State in controlling insurgency or
engaged in any other lawful activity. All such disappearances
caused by such State agents and their collaborators are illegal
and violate fundamental norms established by the international
conventions. All political decisions to plan, encourage and
promote the carrying out of such disappearances, as well as those
decisions to protect culprits, are equally illegal.
From this conclusion it follows:
* That the Working Group should not condone any act of causing
disappearances and should regard and declare them as illegal;
* That the Working Group should not portray such acts of
causing disappearances as legitimate counter-insurgency
activities;
* As there is more information of the nature of these
disappearances now available from the reports of the three Sri
Lankan Presidential Commissions of Inquiry, that the Working
Group may take a stronger position regarding these disappearances
than in the past; and
* That the Working Group should now, on the basis of the
evidence available, treat these disappearances as a crime against
humanity.
Conclusion 2
Only a very small number of the perpetrators of these tens of
thousands of disappearances have been prosecuted, and most cannot
be prosecuted until proper criminal investigations are conducted.
As the normal criminal investigators are police themselves, were
normal procedure followed, in most cases the perpetrators
themselves would be the investigators. Such a procedure would
scarcely create confidence on the part of the complainants, who
are mostly from among the poorest in rural areas of the country
according to the Commissions' reports. The three Commissions were
fact-finding commissions and did not have the human and other
resources to conduct such a vast number of criminal
investigations. Therefore, if justice is to be done, the Sri
Lankan government must appoint a criminal investigation authority
with power and resources to conduct criminal investigations into
these cases.
From this conclusion it follows:
* That the Working Group must state that adequate criminal
investigations have not been conducted into these cases; and
* That the Working Group should recommend that the Sri Lankan
government appoint an authority with powers and resources to
conduct criminal investigations into these cases of
disappearances.
Conclusion 3
As far as the payment of compensation to the victims is
concerned, there is no indication as to whether adequate
compensation has been paid and whether norms set out by the
Working Group in the past have been followed.
From this conclusion it follows:
That the Working Group should examine the nature of the
compensation already paid and make further recommendations in
order to bring such payments into line with the relevant norms.
Submitted by:
Basil FERNANDO
Executive Director
Asian Legal Resource Centre
Posted on 2001-10-29
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